Intergroup cooperation in the lab: asymmetric power relations and redistributive policies

Kerstin Mitterbacher (), Stefan Palan () and Jürgen Fleiß ()
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Kerstin Mitterbacher: University of Graz
Jürgen Fleiß: University of Graz

Empirica, 2024, vol. 51, issue 4, No 1, 877-912

Abstract: Abstract We study intra- and intergroup cooperation in the production and distribution of a jointly created good. Over several periods, members of one group can choose whether or not to contribute to the good’s production. Members of the other group vote to implement a fair or a discriminatory sharing policy for the good’s proceeds. More cooperative behavior by members of an outgroup renders ingroup members more willing to cooperate in turn. Our experiment documents reciprocity in intergroup cooperation settings. This reciprocity at times leads to mutually beneficial cooperation but when one group defects, it may also lead to cooperation breaking down. Understanding how one group’s cooperation influences another group’s decisions can improve resource allocation as well as influence policy-makers’ decisions towards fairer distribution strategies.

Keywords: Asymmetric power relations; Intergroup game; Jointly created goods; Laboratory experiment; Redistributive policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s10663-024-09623-1

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