EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Optimal insurance contract under a value-at-risk constraint

Hung-Hsi Huang ()

The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, 2006, vol. 31, issue 2, 91-110

Abstract: This study develops an optimal insurance contract endogenously under a value-at-risk (VaR) constraint. Although Wang et al. [2005] had examined this problem, their assumption implied that the insured is risk neutral. Consequently, this study extends Wang et al. [2005] and further considers a more realistic situation where the insured is risk averse. The study derives the optimal insurance contract as a single deductible insurance when the VaR constraint is redundant or as a double deductible insurance when the VaR constraint is binding. Finally, this study discusses the optimal coverage level from common forms of insurances, including deductible insurance, upper-limit insurance, and proportional coinsurance. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2006

Keywords: Value-at-risk; Optimal insurance; Deductible; Policy limit; Coinsurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10713-006-0557-5 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:geneva:v:31:y:2006:i:2:p:91-110

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10713

DOI: 10.1007/s10713-006-0557-5

Access Statistics for this article

The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory is currently edited by Michael Hoy and Nicolas Treich

More articles in The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory from Springer, International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:kap:geneva:v:31:y:2006:i:2:p:91-110