Endogenous employment rate in the efficiency wage shirking approach
International Advances in Economic Research, 2004, vol. 10, issue 2, 113-122
The aim of New Keynesian theorists is to obtain Keynesian results on the basis of maximizing behavior. Accordingly, the New Keynesian shirking models depict a world of fully rational maximizing agents where equilibrium unemployment is the main consequence of the payment of efficiency wages. The problem is that oversimplified nature of most shirking models has until now prevented a full investigation of the interdependence of unemployment, the effort supplied by workers and labor demand. This article shows that the existence of this interdependence weakens the whole approach. In particular, when the unemployment rate is considered a truly endogenous variable, the stability of the macroeconomic equilibrium is generally incompatible with the existence of unemployment ascribed to the fact that firms pay efficiency wages. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:iaecre:v:10:y:2004:i:2:p:113-122:10.1007/bf02295674
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
International Advances in Economic Research is currently edited by Katherine S. Virgo
More articles in International Advances in Economic Research from Springer, International Atlantic Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().