Power Politics and International Labor Standards

Stephen DeLoach (), Jayoti Das and Lindsey Conley

International Advances in Economic Research, 2006, vol. 12, issue 1, 66 pages

Abstract: This paper analyzes how a country's commitment to labor standards is affected by the international political power they possess. Powerful countries may be less committed to actual enforcement of certain labor standards since they are unlikely to face significant threats of international sanctions regardless of their actions. The paper introduces an index of international power for 116 countries that is used to examine how power affects the extent to which countries enforce standards relating to freedom of association and collective bargaining. The evidence suggests that, even after controlling for differences in wealth, productivity, and market freedom, powerful countries are significantly less committed to the protection of labor standards than less powerful countries. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2006

Keywords: F16; J58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11294-006-6133-z

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