Political Representation and Legislative Bargaining over Redistribution

Yuta Saito

International Advances in Economic Research, 2019, vol. 25, issue 3, No 1, 262 pages

Abstract: Abstract The theories of dynamic legislative bargaining have supposed that the distribution of legislators are constant across periods. In reality, a transition in the economic condition makes people change the candidate they vote for and politicians alter their opinions. Regarding the redistribution and inequality issue, a redistribution policy affects the future legislators’ policy preferences via influencing the economic inequality among the people. This paper recognizes such a feedback effect and investigates its effect on the outcomes in the legislature. This finding suggests that a high political representation causes a high capital accumulation associated with a low expected tax rate. Socially efficient allocation can be reached only if the political representation is perfect.

Keywords: Dynamic bargaining; Political representation; Inequality; Capital taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 E00 E20 E62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/s11294-019-09749-0

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