An empirical analysis of the U.S. Senate vote on NAFTA and GATT

Nipoli Kamdar and Jorge Gonzalez

International Advances in Economic Research, 1998, vol. 4, issue 2, 105-114

Abstract: This paper examines the determinants of the voting behavior of the U.S. Senate on the North American Free Trade Agreement and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Public choice theory suggests that the voting behavior of senators is influenced by constituent interests, special interest politics, and their ideology. This paper uses probit analysis to test the significance of the above factors. The results indicate that constituent economic interests and special interest money were significant determinants of the Senate voting on the North American Free Trade Agreement but not on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 1998

Date: 1998
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DOI: 10.1007/BF02295483

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