Do environmental treaties matter?

William Gissy ()

International Advances in Economic Research, 1998, vol. 4, issue 4, 417 pages

Abstract: This paper examines a two-country model where each country produces a negative global externality. The results indicate that a locally oriented country has an incentive to negotiate a treaty with the other, however, the outcome is not a globally optimal one. Additionally, this paper demonstrates that when a locally oriented country operates with complete ignorance regarding the other country's intentions, a result approximating global optimum occurs. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 1998

Date: 1998
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DOI: 10.1007/BF02295694

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