Foreign aid as a discipline on illegal immigration

Tikva Lecker

International Advances in Economic Research, 2000, vol. 6, issue 3, 577 pages

Abstract: This paper deals with a sanctions policy toward reducing illegal immigration. Using a single-period game, it shows that by imposing a penalty on each apprehended illegal alien, the host country will increase the motivation of the source country to expend money for preventing illegal immigration. It is also shown that although the sanctions are allowed to go only one way, by increasing the efficiency of catching illegal aliens, both parties will be motivated to expend money for restraining illegal immigration. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2000

Date: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF02294973 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:iaecre:v:6:y:2000:i:3:p:571-577:10.1007/bf02294973

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/11294

DOI: 10.1007/BF02294973

Access Statistics for this article

International Advances in Economic Research is currently edited by Katherine S. Virgo

More articles in International Advances in Economic Research from Springer, International Atlantic Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().