Why governments sell public firms: The Spanish case

Joaquim Vergés-Jaime

International Advances in Economic Research, 2001, vol. 7, issue 1, 114-132

Abstract: This paper compares the goals that the successive Spanish governments have actually pursued (as deduced from the set of privatizations carried out over the last fifteen years) with the standard hypotheses used in economic literature to explain privatization in general. The results show that the cash-collecting goal appears as the relevant explanatory hypotheses for most of the privatizations carried out. Also, all of the state-owned firms that operated under monopoly conditions have actually been privatized but retain, at least partially, their monopoly position (they involve activities where natural monopoly features are present). This has led to establishing new regulatory rules (reregulation) and that privatization, per se, has not resulted in substantial improvements in competition. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2001

Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1007/BF02296597

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