The unimportance of the choice-value thesis in economics

Björn Frank

International Advances in Economic Research, 2002, vol. 8, issue 2, 97-106

Abstract: The choice-value thesis claims that people always choose what is best for them, given their information on the set of alternatives. This paper attempts to show that this assumption is less important than is suggested by the high esteem in which it is held. Modern economics neither relies on it, as shown by inspecting a sample of 742 papers, nor does the rejection of the choice-value thesis imply paternalism, as is sometimes suggested. It is shown that paternalism can be argued against without referring to the choice-value thesis. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2002

Date: 2002
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DOI: 10.1007/BF02295340

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