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Effect of pay-for-performance on cervical cancer screening participation in France

Panayotis Constantinou (), Jonathan Sicsic and Carine Franc ()
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Panayotis Constantinou: Université Paris-Saclay, Université Paris-Sud, UVSQ
Carine Franc: Université Paris-Saclay, Université Paris-Sud, UVSQ

International Journal of Health Economics and Management, 2017, vol. 17, issue 2, 181-201

Abstract: Abstract Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been increasingly used across different healthcare settings to incentivize the provision of targeted services. In this study, we investigated the effect of a nationwide P4P scheme for general practitioners implemented in 2012 in France, on cervical cancer screening practices. Using data from a nationally representative permanent sample of health insurance beneficiaries, we analyzed smear test use of eligible women for the years 2006–2014. Our longitudinal sample was an unbalanced panel comprising 180,167 women eligible from 1 to 9 years each. We took into account that during our study period some women were exposed to another incentive for screening participation: the implementation in 2010 of organized screening (OS) in a limited number of areas. To evaluate the effect of P4P, we defined three different measures of smear utilization. For each measure, we specified binary panel-data models to estimate annual probabilities and to compare each estimate to the 2011 baseline level. To explore the combined effect of P4P and OS in areas exposed to both incentives, we computed interaction terms between year dummies and area of residence. We found that P4P had a modest positive effect on recommended screening participation. This effect is likely to be transient as annual smear use, both for the whole sample and among women overdue for screening, increased only in 2013 and decreased again in 2014. The combined effect of P4P and OS on screening participation was not cumulative during the first years of coexistence.

Keywords: Pay for performance; Cervical cancer screening; Preventive health services; Primary health care; France (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I18 C23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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