Health insurance and ex ante moral hazard: evidence from Medicare

Dhaval Dave and Robert Kaestner

International Journal of Health Economics and Management, 2009, vol. 9, issue 4, 367-390

Keywords: Insurance; Moral hazard; Health behavior; I12; I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (91)

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Working Paper: Health Insurance and Ex Ante Moral Hazard: Evidence from Medicare (2006)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10754-009-9056-4

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