How Much Tax Coordination in the European Union?
International Tax and Public Finance, 2003, vol. 10, issue 6, 625-49
This paper examines the trade-offs between tax autonomy and fiscal neutrality that the Member States of the European Union face in coordinating their taxes on consumption, labor and capital. One of the main messages is that in many cases tax reform should precede tax harmonization, mainly because the costs of distortions within Member States may be greater than the gains from reducing intergovernmental tax competition. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0927-5940/contents link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:10:y:2003:i:6:p:625-49
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/10797/PS2
Access Statistics for this article
International Tax and Public Finance is currently edited by Ronald B. Davies and Kimberly Scharf
More articles in International Tax and Public Finance from Springer, International Institute of Public Finance Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().