EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Fiscal Decentralization: A Remedy for Corruption?

G. Gulsun Arikan ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Guzin Gulsun Akin ()

International Tax and Public Finance, 2004, vol. 11, issue 2, 175-195

Abstract: This paper examines the effect of fiscal decentralization in a country on the level of corruption. Using a tax competition framework with rent-seeking behavior, it is shown theoretically that fiscal decentralization, modeled as an increase in the number of competing jurisdictions, leads to a lower level of corruption. This result is then tested using a small, cross-country data set. The empirical results are not very strong, but they suggest that the hypothesized relationship between decentralization and corruption may indeed exist.

Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (64) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0927-5940/contents (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:11:y:2004:i:2:p:175-195

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/10797/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

International Tax and Public Finance is currently edited by Ronald B. Davies and Kimberly Scharf

More articles in International Tax and Public Finance from Springer, International Institute of Public Finance Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().

 
Page updated 2018-06-19
Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:11:y:2004:i:2:p:175-195