Environmental Tax Competition in the Presence of Multinational Firms

Essi Eerola

International Tax and Public Finance, 2004, vol. 11, issue 3, 283-298

Abstract: We study the design of environmental policy in a two country model with an imperfectly competitive polluting industry. We show that when the firms are multinational, non-cooperative policy design leads to too severe emission taxation regardless of the mode of competition. The reason is twofold. First, when firms are multinational, changes in environmental policy do not influence the market shares of the firms. Second, when designing their policies, national governments ignore profits accruing to foreign shareholders of multinational firms.

Date: 2004
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