On Spatial Public Finance Empirics
Federico Revelli ()
International Tax and Public Finance, 2005, vol. 12, issue 4, 475-492
This paper focuses on the empirical specification of theoretical models of strategic interaction that give rise to a spatial pattern in local government expenditures and revenues. It shows that estimation of a reduced form inter-jurisdictional reaction function might not by itself allow to discriminate among competing strategic interaction theories. A review of the recent empirical literature suggests that exploring in more depth the specific empirical implications of alternative theoretical models, as well as fully exploiting the institutional features of multi-tiered government structures and local electoral systems, can help identify the structural model generating the observed spatial auto-correlation in policy variables. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005
Keywords: fiscal externalities; expenditure spill-over; tax competition; yardstick competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (129) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:12:y:2005:i:4:p:475-492
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/10797/PS2
Access Statistics for this article
International Tax and Public Finance is currently edited by Ronald B. Davies and Kimberly Scharf
More articles in International Tax and Public Finance from Springer, International Institute of Public Finance Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().