Export Competition and the Remission of Domestic Environmental Taxes

Steve Mccorriston () and Ian Sheldon

International Tax and Public Finance, 2005, vol. 12, issue 5, 627-637

Abstract: We consider the use of border adjustments to compensate exporters for domestic environmental taxes imposed on an intermediate good. A model of successive oligopoly is used to consider the appropriate border adjustments. In this set-up, the relative importance of the forward incidence of the environmental tax and the backward incidence of the remission play a key role. The results highlight that the simple rule employed by GATT/WTO to set the export remittance equal to the level of the environmental tax is likely to be inappropriate. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Keywords: environmental taxes; border adjustments; imperfect competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10797-005-0476-x (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: EXPORT COMPETITION AND THE REMISSION OF DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:12:y:2005:i:5:p:627-637

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/10797/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10797-005-0476-x

Access Statistics for this article

International Tax and Public Finance is currently edited by Ronald B. Davies and Kimberly Scharf

More articles in International Tax and Public Finance from Springer, International Institute of Public Finance Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().