Is There a Connection Between the Tax Administration and the Political Power?

Alejandro Esteller-Moré ()

International Tax and Public Finance, 2005, vol. 12, issue 5, 639-663

Abstract: This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power at the regional level. Firstly, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an “income effect” which disincentivises the efforts of the regional tax administration. Secondly, these efforts tend to be lower in those electoral districts where vote turnout is high, the margin to lose a parliamentary seat is narrow and their parliamentary representation is high, although the importance of these disincentives decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent. Finally, leftist governments, through the tax administration, tend to exert a greater effort in ensuring tax compliance. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Keywords: tax administration; political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:12:y:2005:i:5:p:639-663

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DOI: 10.1007/s10797-005-2651-5

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