A Note on Intertemporal Fiscal Competition and Redistribution

Kersten Kellermann ()

International Tax and Public Finance, 2006, vol. 13, issue 2, 161 pages

Abstract: This paper studies fiscal competition among jurisdictions in a dynamic framework, where the degree of mobility of private capital across jurisdictions boundaries is perfect. The optimal tax on mobile capital is a source tax that taxes away factor rents. Further we show that taxation of mobile capital can redistribute income in favor of the immobile factor labor. This is because the factor rents generated by public inputs and appropriated by mobile capital exceed the efficient level of public expenditure for investments. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006

Keywords: fiscal competition; tax competition; public inputs; source tax; capital taxation; capital mobility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1007/s10797-006-2462-3

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