Should we subsidize work? Welfare reform, the earned income tax credit and optimal transfers
Gregory Acs () and
International Tax and Public Finance, 2007, vol. 14, issue 3, 327-343
During the 1990s, US income transfer and tax policies shifted towards trying to encourage work among low-income families. Optimal tax theory, however, suggests that work subsidies are usually an inefficient way to raise the incomes of poor families unless the work effort of recipients has external benefits and/or tax payer/voters prefer redistributing income to the working poor rather than the idle poor. This paper discusses the conditions under which work subsidies may be economically efficient and assesses empirical evidence that suggests that welfare reform and expansions of the EITC have increased work effort among low income families, but is inconclusive about whether the policy shift has enabled them to advance beyond entry-level jobs or benefited their children. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007
Keywords: Optimal taxes and transfers; Earned income tax credit; Welfare reform; External benefits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:14:y:2007:i:3:p:327-343
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/10797/PS2
Access Statistics for this article
International Tax and Public Finance is currently edited by Ronald B. Davies and Kimberly Scharf
More articles in International Tax and Public Finance from Springer, International Institute of Public Finance Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().