Federalism, weak institutions and the competition for foreign direct investment

Sebastian Kessing, Kai Konrad and Christos Kotsogiannis

International Tax and Public Finance, 2009, vol. 16, issue 1, 105-123

Keywords: Foreign direct investment; Hold-up problem; Federalism; Vertical tax competition; Bidding for firms; Tax base cooccupation; F34; F42; H11; H71; H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10797-007-9058-4

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