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Emergence of populism under ambiguity

Daiki Kishishita

International Tax and Public Finance, 2018, vol. 25, issue 6, 1559-1562

Abstract: Abstract The aim of this article is to provide a short summary of the study that obtained the ITAX Ph.D. Award in 2017 (Kishishita, in: Emergence of populism under risk and ambiguity, 2017. ). This study is a game-theoretic analysis of populism using a dynamic elections model with information asymmetries. The main focus is the effect of uncertainty voters face about an elite’s degree of bias on the emergence of populism. Interestingly, its effect is different depending on the source of the uncertainty. In particular, an increase in risk and that in ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty) work in the opposite directions with higher ambiguity rather than risk being a significant source of populism.

Keywords: Populism; Dynamic electrons; Political agency; Ambiguity; Risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H11 D81 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:25:y:2018:i:6:d:10.1007_s10797-018-9519-y