Profit shifting and corruption
Katarzyna Bilicka () and
International Tax and Public Finance, 2020, vol. 27, issue 5, No 1, 1080 pages
Abstract This paper introduces heterogeneous profit shifting costs induced by corrupt tax officials to the analysis of profit shifting of multinationals. Using a theoretically derived corruption weighted tax differential, we show that corruption increases profit shifting of European firms. We use our estimates to calculate the implied tax revenue elasticities for European countries and find that countries with otherwise similar tax rates face lower tax revenue elasticities when they are more corrupt. This means that corruption negatively affects the revenue gains that countries could have from increasing their tax rates.
Keywords: Corruption; Profit shifting; Tax revenue elasticities; H25; H26; D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: PROFIT SHIFTING AND CORRUPTION (2018)
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