The determinants of political selection: a citizen-candidate model with valence signaling and incumbency advantage

Susana Peralta () and Tanguy Ypersele ()
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Susana Peralta: Nova School of Business and Economics
Tanguy Ypersele: Aix Marseille Univ, CNRS, AMSE

International Tax and Public Finance, 2025, vol. 32, issue 2, No 6, 525 pages

Abstract: Abstract We expand the theory of politician quality in electoral democracies with citizen candidates by supposing that performance while in office sends a signal to the voters about the politician’s valence. Individuals live two periods and decide to become candidates when young, trading off against type-specific private wages. The valence signal increases the reelection chances of high valence incumbents (screening mechanism of reelection), and thus their expected gain from running for office (self-selection mechanism). Since self-selection improves the average quality of challengers, voters become more demanding when evaluating the incumbent’s performance. This complementarity between the self-selection and the screening mechanisms may lead to multiple equilibria. We show that more difficult and/or less variable political jobs increase the politicians’ quality. Conversely, societies with more wage inequality have lower quality polities. We also show that incumbency advantage blurs the screening mechanism by giving incumbents an upper-hand in electoral competition and may wipe out the positive effect of the screening mechanism on the quality of the polity.

Keywords: Endogenous candidates; Political accountability; Incumbency advantage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s10797-024-09831-2

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