Populist policy making

Massimo Morelli ()
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Massimo Morelli: Bocconi University

International Tax and Public Finance, 2025, vol. 32, issue 6, No 3, 1667-1690

Abstract: Abstract Policymaking involves both politicians and bureaucratic agencies, and their interaction is regulated by a number of institutional rules. The populists who manage to enter an executive office typically wish to weaken checks and balances, including the bureaucracy. Thus, the consequences of populism for economic policy can be divided in direct consequences and indirect consequences, through the institutional erosion they cause. Moreover, they can be divided in subnational, national, and global consequences. The paper ends with some advocacy of European-level policymaking rather than national policymaking.

Keywords: Populism; Commitment; Trust; Checks and balances; Liberal democracy; Nationalism trap; European taxation; D70; H56; H73; J68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s10797-025-09916-6

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