Demographic Shock and Social Security: A Political Economy Perspective
Georges Casamatta (),
Helmuth Cremer and
Pierre Pestieau
International Tax and Public Finance, 2001, vol. 8, issue 4, 417-431
Abstract:
We assume that individual voters differ not only according to age but also productivity. In the steady state, workers with wages in the intermediate range join the retired persons to form a majority and vote for a positive level of social security. When a shock decreases population growth, entrenched interests can constrain majority voting decisions and prevent reforms in the name of entitlements. We show that from a Rawlsian viewpoint it may be desirable to rely on these entitlements to protect the low wage earners of the transition generations. However, when the possibility of fixing a basic pension is introduced, it constitutes a better instrument than entitlements. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001
Keywords: social security; majority voting; entitlements; aging (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1011214823251
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