On the Political Economy of Low Skilled Immigration and the Welfare State

Alexander Kemnitz

International Tax and Public Finance, 2002, vol. 9, issue 4, 423-434

Abstract: This paper inquires into the collective decision making on both unemployment insurance and immigration. It is shown that low skill immigration typically increases the contribution rate to the unemployment insurance system. This can translate into higher benefits, the increase of the economy-wide unemployment rate nonwithstanding. The host country allows for immigration only if high skilled natives are sufficiently powerful. Furthermore, political rights of immigrants are restricted to a minimum. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Keywords: immigration policy; democracy; unemployment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1016516019418

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