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Reducing Demand for Litigation in Consumer Disputes—a Randomized Field Experiment with Social Information

Andreas Maaløe Jespersen ()
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Andreas Maaløe Jespersen: Roskilde University

Journal of Consumer Policy, 2018, vol. 41, issue 1, 21-32

Abstract: Abstract It has long been argued that alternative dispute resolution is superior to traditional court litigation. The paper reviews traditional and behavioural arguments and findings for why litigation rates remain high. The paper then reports on a natural field experiment designed to test how to improve disputes between consumers and businesses in Denmark resolution by including social information into the dispute process. The experiment demonstrates that social information significantly affects litigants’ need for litigation, but that the effect on settlement rates is non-significant. The results are discussed along with suggestions for possible future research into improving the willingness to cooperate in consumer disputes.

Keywords: Consumer policy; Alternative dispute resolution; Negotiation theory; Behavioural law and economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Journal of Consumer Policy is currently edited by Hans Micklitz, John Thøgersen, Lucia A. Reisch, Alan Mathios and Christian Twigg-Flesner

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Handle: RePEc:kap:jcopol:v:41:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10603-018-9370-7