Contract-Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance

Christopher Clague, Philip Keefer, Stephen Knack and Mancur Olson

Journal of Economic Growth, 1999, vol. 4, issue 2, 185-211

Abstract: We introduce a new, easily accessed and objective measure of the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights. This measure, called "contract-intensive money" or CIM, is based on citizens' decisions regarding the form in which they choose to hold their financial assets. Country case studies show that CIM varies over time in response to political events in ways predicted by our arguments. We also show that CIM is positively related to investment and growth rates, and to the relative size of contract-dependent sectors of the economy. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1999
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