Inventing or Spying? Implications for Growth

Guido Cozzi

Journal of Economic Growth, 2001, vol. 6, issue 1, 55-77

Abstract: An engineer graduates if she derives the obvious implications of her instructor's hints. But the patent system rewards only the first to present nonobvious advancements--ideas similarly skilled engineers are not expected to invent. If a fraction of the newly invented hints spill over before the technological advances they entail are completed and granted legal protection, the R&D workers will find it convenient to spend some time searching for each other's hints instead of creating their own. A simple modification of the basic Schumpeterian model shows that the larger the skilled population, the larger the relative incentive to spy. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2001
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