The comparative statics of differential rents in two-sided matching markets

Wing Suen

The Journal of Economic Inequality, 2007, vol. 5, issue 2, 149-158

Abstract: This paper studies how shifts in the distribution of quality on one side of the market affect earnings on the other side in a model of one-to-one matching. A more dispersed distribution of quality hurts the low ability agents on the other side because they are matched to inferior partners. Earnings being a differential rent in these markets, this pulls down the earnings of high quality agents as well. It is shown that a more dispersed ability distribution reduces total earnings on the opposite side of the market. Under some conditions, all agents on that side are hurt. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2007

Keywords: assignment model; skill premium; stochastic dominance; D31; J31; J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: The Comparative Statics of Differential Rents in Two-Sided Matching Markets (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jecinq:v:5:y:2007:i:2:p:149-158

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DOI: 10.1007/s10888-006-9034-8

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