Economics at your fingertips  

Leaders and competitors

Sususmu Cato () and Ryoko Oki

Journal of Economics, 2012, vol. 107, issue 3, 239-255

Abstract: The purpose of this article is to investigate the properties of equilibrium in a market with a leader. In particular, we examine how the equilibrium values depend on existing competitors. When the number of competitors is exogenously given, most equilibrium values, including the leader’s strategies, depend on the structure of the competitors: the number of incumbent competitors, their technologies, and their objective functions. In contrast, when an entry is endogenous, the equilibrium values, including not only the leader’s strategies but the entrants’ as well, are independent of such properties of the incumbent competitors. We provide several applications of our main result in industrial organization issues. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

Keywords: Leadership; Endogenous entry; Strategic commitment; Incumbent competitor; L11; L13; L16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economics is currently edited by Giacomo Corneo

More articles in Journal of Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().

Page updated 2019-12-22
Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:107:y:2012:i:3:p:239-255