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Regulating a manager whose empire-building preferences are private information

Ana Borges (), Joao Correia-da-Silva and Didier Laussel ()

Journal of Economics, 2014, vol. 111, issue 2, 105-130

Abstract: We obtain the optimal contract for the government (principal) to regulate a manager (agent) who has a taste for empire-building that is his/her private information. This taste for empire-building is modeled as a utility premium that is proportional to the difference between the contracted output and a reference output. We find that output is distorted upward when the manager’s taste for running large firms is weak, downward when it is strong, and equals a reference output when it is intermediate (in this case, the participation constraint is binding). We also obtain an endogenous reference output (equal to the expected output, which depends on the reference output), and find that the response of output to cost is null in the short-run (in which the reference output is fixed), whenever the manager’s type is in the intermediate range, and negative in the long-run (after the adjustment of the reference output to equal expected output). Copyright Springer-Verlag Wien 2014

Keywords: Procurement; Regulation; Adverse selection; Empire-building; Reservation utility; D82; H42; H51; I11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:111:y:2014:i:2:p:105-130

DOI: 10.1007/s00712-012-0325-1

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