Media bias, slant regulation, and the public-interest media

Wen-Chung Guo and Fu-Chuan Lai

Journal of Economics, 2015, vol. 114, issue 3, 308 pages

Abstract: This study addresses the role of government in reducing media bias that arises from the demand side. Introducing a public-interest media outlet reduces the equilibrium slants that would otherwise exist under laissez-faire. Subsidy for the truthful report and price regulation are designed to effectively remedy media bias. The socially optimal subsidy policy can reduce both slant and media prices. Copyright Springer-Verlag Wien 2015

Keywords: Hotelling; Media bias; Public-interest media; Regulation; D43; H21; L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:114:y:2015:i:3:p:291-308

DOI: 10.1007/s00712-014-0396-2

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