Risk aversion in the Nash bargaining problem with uncertainty
Sanxi Li (),
Hailin Sun (),
Jianye Yan () and
Xundong Yin ()
Journal of Economics, 2015, vol. 115, issue 3, 257-274
In this study, we apply the aggregation property of Identical Shape Harmonic Absolute Risk Aversion utility functions to analyze the comparative statics properties of a bargaining model with uncertainty. We identify sufficient and necessary conditions under which an increase in one’s degree of risk aversion benefits/hurts one’s opponent. We apply our model to analyze the problems of bargaining over both insurance and incentive contracts. Copyright Springer-Verlag Wien 2015
Keywords: Bargaining; The Nash solution; ISHARA preference; Risk aversion; C70; C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:115:y:2015:i:3:p:257-274
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