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Risk aversion in the Nash bargaining problem with uncertainty

Sanxi Li (), Hailin Sun (), Jianye Yan () and Xundong Yin ()

Journal of Economics, 2015, vol. 115, issue 3, 257-274

Abstract: In this study, we apply the aggregation property of Identical Shape Harmonic Absolute Risk Aversion utility functions to analyze the comparative statics properties of a bargaining model with uncertainty. We identify sufficient and necessary conditions under which an increase in one’s degree of risk aversion benefits/hurts one’s opponent. We apply our model to analyze the problems of bargaining over both insurance and incentive contracts. Copyright Springer-Verlag Wien 2015

Keywords: Bargaining; The Nash solution; ISHARA preference; Risk aversion; C70; C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:115:y:2015:i:3:p:257-274