Economics at your fingertips  

International cross-ownership of firms and strategic privatization policy

Dapeng Cai () and Yukio Karasawa-Ohtashiro ()

Journal of Economics, 2015, vol. 116, issue 1, 39-62

Abstract: We consider how the international cross-ownership of firms affects the privatization of a public firm competing with foreign firms. We show that when firms compete á la Cournot in a third market under a linear demand function, the domestic ownership of foreign firms can impede privatization, whereas the foreign ownership of the domestic firm can promote privatization. Moreover, the domestic ownership of foreign firms can render neither complete privatization nor complete nationalization optimal under moderate conditions. Conversely, when firms compete á la Bertrand, we demonstrate that it is always optimal to pursue complete nationalization. Copyright Springer-Verlag Wien 2015

Keywords: Cross-ownership; Privatization; Mixed enterprises; State ownership; F12; F13; H44; L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

DOI: 10.1007/s00712-014-0429-x

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economics is currently edited by Giacomo Corneo

More articles in Journal of Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

Page updated 2021-12-06
Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:116:y:2015:i:1:p:39-62