Competition and uncertainty in a paper’s news desk
Ascension Andina-Diaz
Journal of Economics, 2015, vol. 116, issue 1, 77-93
Abstract:
We propose a model in which different types of journalists have superior information to a newspaper’s editor. Journalists compete for having their report published, but when writing their reports, they are uncertain about the preferences of the editor. We analyze the effects of competition and uncertainty on the incentives of the journalists to write informative reports. We obtain that there is not a unique prediction as to the effects of competition, but the correct answer depends on how much uncertainty there is. Thus, if the editor is perceived to be honest, we show there is an equilibrium in which all the journalists write informative reports, provided that a certain level of competition is met. In contrast, if the editor is perceived to be biased, partial revelation of information exists, even in the absence of competition. Last, high levels of uncertainty inevitably results in uninformative reporting. Copyright Springer-Verlag Wien 2015
Keywords: Information transmission; Media bias; Competing journalists; Uncertainty; D72; D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Working Paper: Competition and uncertainty in a paper's news desk (2013) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:116:y:2015:i:1:p:77-93
DOI: 10.1007/s00712-014-0426-0
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