Stability, strategic substitutes, strategic complements

Jeroen Hinloopen

Journal of Economics, 2015, vol. 116, issue 2, 129-135

Abstract: The Routh–Hurwitz stability condition is disentangled for choice variables that are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. This yields distinct stability conditions that are not necessarily symmetric. Two examples illustrate this result. Copyright Springer-Verlag Wien 2015

Keywords: Strategic substitutes; Strategic complements; Stability conditions; C62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:116:y:2015:i:2:p:129-135

DOI: 10.1007/s00712-014-0422-4

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