Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly model

José Naya ()

Journal of Economics, 2015, vol. 116, issue 2, 165-174

Abstract: This paper complements the existing literature on endogenous timing in mixed duopoly models by assuming that there is a private firm and a partly privatized one in the market. It is shown that the endogenous timing of the game depends on both the partially privatized firm degree of privatization and the existing product differentiation. However, the obtained results assuming Cournot competition are quite different to those obtained under Bertrand competition. Copyright Springer-Verlag Wien 2015

Keywords: Mixed oligopoly; Cournot and Bertrand competition; Endogenous timing; L00; L13; L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:116:y:2015:i:2:p:165-174

DOI: 10.1007/s00712-014-0416-2

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