Revenue royalties

Stefano Colombo () and Luigi Filippini

Journal of Economics, 2016, vol. 118, issue 1, No 3, 47-76

Abstract: Abstract Under the assumption of decreasing returns to scale, we compare several licensing mechanisms—per-unit royalty, an ad valorem royalty, and a revenue-royalty, and combinations with fixed fees—for an insider patentee. In the case of a non-drastic innovation, the patentee maximizes its profits by offering, respectively, an ad valorem royalty, a revenue-royalty and a two-part per-unit royalty, if the cost function is scarcely or highly convex, moderately-low convex, and moderately-high convex. In the case of a drastic innovation, the patentee always offers an ad valorem royalty contract.

Keywords: Patent licensing; Convex cost function; Royalties on revenues; Royalties on profits; Per-unit royalties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00712-015-0459-z Abstract (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:118:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s00712-015-0459-z

DOI: 10.1007/s00712-015-0459-z

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economics is currently edited by Giacomo Corneo

More articles in Journal of Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().