Mixed oligopolies and collusion
Stefano Colombo ()
Journal of Economics, 2016, vol. 118, issue 2, 167-184
Abstract We introduce a firm partially owned by the government in a dynamic model of collusion between a subset of private firms. We show that increasing the public ownership of the non-colluding firm may help collusion between the private firms.
Keywords: Mixed oligopolies; Collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:118:y:2016:i:2:d:10.1007_s00712-015-0467-z
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