Multistage public education, voting, and income distribution
Katsuyuki Naito and
Keigo Nishida ()
Journal of Economics, 2017, vol. 120, issue 1, 65-78
Abstract This paper proposes a theory to study the formulation of education policies and human capital accumulation. The government collects income taxes and allocates tax revenue to primary and higher education. The tax rate and the allocation rule are both endogenously determined through majority voting. The tax rate is kept at a low level, and public funding for higher education is not supported unless the majority of individuals have human capital above some threshold. Although public support for higher education promotes aggregate human capital accumulation, it may create long-run income inequality because the poor are excluded from higher education.
Keywords: Majority voting; Public education; Multistage education; Human capital accumulation; Income distribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H52 I24 I25 O43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:120:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s00712-016-0513-5
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