Norms and monetary fines as deterrents, and distributive effects

Kangoh Lee ()
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Kangoh Lee: San Diego State University

Journal of Economics, 2017, vol. 121, issue 1, No 1, 27 pages

Abstract: Abstract Both social norms and monetary fines can deter acts that are privately beneficial but socially undesirable. The number and the identities of those who commit the acts differ between with norms and with fines. Fines are more likely to make higher-income individuals better off than norms. As a society becomes more affluent, fines are more likely to increase the number of those who commit than norms, and norms become the better system of deterring socially undesirable acts.

Keywords: Externality; Norms; Fines; Deterrent; Income effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 H10 K42 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:121:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s00712-016-0517-1

DOI: 10.1007/s00712-016-0517-1

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