Apportioning indivisible damage and strategic diffusion of pollution abatement technology

Yi Li ()
Additional contact information
Yi Li: Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

Journal of Economics, 2019, vol. 126, issue 1, No 2, 19-42

Abstract: Abstract I examine the problem of apportioning liability among competing firms in an industry where the environmental damage is a joint product of the actions taken by all firms. In particular, I analyze the effect of alternative apportionment rules on adoption and strategic diffusion of pollution abatement technology. In a duopoly where industry wide technological diffusion is welfare enhancing, I characterize the second-best optimal apportionment rules. Inducing technology transfer requires placing a larger burden of the liability on the ex ante cleaner firm i.e., the one with a more efficient abatement technology.

Keywords: Strict liability; Apportionment rule; Technology diffusion; Duopoly; Environmental regulation; D43; L1; Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00712-018-0610-8 Abstract (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:126:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s00712-018-0610-8

DOI: 10.1007/s00712-018-0610-8

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economics is currently edited by Giacomo Corneo

More articles in Journal of Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().