EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Other-regarding preferences in organizational hierarchies

Kemal Saygili () and Serkan Küçükşenel ()
Additional contact information
Kemal Saygili: Middle East Technical University

Journal of Economics, 2019, vol. 126, issue 3, No 1, 219 pages

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we provide new theoretical insights about the role of collusion in organizational hierarchies by combining the standard principal–supervisor–agent framework with a theory of social preferences. Extending Tirole’s (J Law Econ Organ 2(2):181–214, 1986) model of hierarchy with the inclusion of Fehr and Schmidt (Q J Econ 114(3):817–868, 1999) type of other-regarding preferences, the links between inequity aversion, collusive behavior and changes in optimal contracts are studied. It turns out that other-regarding preferences do change the collusive behavior among parties depending on the nature of both agent’s and supervisor’s other-regarding preferences. The most prominent impact is on the optimal effort levels. When the agent is inequity averse, the principal can exploit this fact to make agent exert higher effort level than she would otherwise. In order to satisfy the participation constraint of the supervisor, the effort level induced for the agent becomes lower when the supervisor is status seeker, and it is higher when the supervisor is inequity averse.

Keywords: Other-regarding preferences; Hierarchy; Collusive behavior; Optimal contract design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D90 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00712-018-0628-y Abstract (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Other-Regarding Preferences in Organizational Hierarchies (2018) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:126:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s00712-018-0628-y

DOI: 10.1007/s00712-018-0628-y

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economics is currently edited by Giacomo Corneo

More articles in Journal of Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2023-01-25
Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:126:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s00712-018-0628-y