Competition in online markets with auctions and posted prices

Alexander Maslov

Journal of Economics, 2022, vol. 137, issue 2, No 3, 145-169

Abstract: Abstract The paper studies an online consumer-to-consumer market with limited supply, where sellers may list their items by posted prices or auctions. I show that when there is competition among sellers, they use only posted prices in the equilibrium. This result contrasts with the findings for a monopolistic seller listing objects by auctions and posted prices on markets with infinite supply, where using both mechanisms is the equilibrium. The model helps to explain the trends documented in Einav et al. (J Polit Econ 126(1):178–215, 2018).

Keywords: E-commerce; Auctions; Price posting; Competing mechanisms; Duopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 D43 D44 L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00712-022-00784-w Abstract (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:137:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s00712-022-00784-w

DOI: 10.1007/s00712-022-00784-w

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economics is currently edited by Giacomo Corneo

More articles in Journal of Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().