Large Tullock contests

Serhat Doğan, Emin Karagözoğlu, Kerim Keskin and Çağrı Sağlam
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Serhat Doğan: Bilkent University

Journal of Economics, 2023, vol. 140, issue 2, No 4, 169-179

Abstract: Abstract We characterize the equilibrium effort function of a large Tullock contest game with heterogeneous agents under mild conditions on the contest success function and effort cost function. Later, writing the equilibrium total effort explicitly under a uniform type distribution, we identify the effort-maximizing large Tullock contest. It is shown that the contest designer needs to increase the curvature of the effective effort function, thereby encouraging high-type agents to exert even higher efforts, as the curvature of the effort cost function increases or the support of the type distribution gets narrower.

Keywords: Large game; Tullock contests; Asymmetric contest; Contest design; Effort-maximizing contests (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D47 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:140:y:2023:i:2:d:10.1007_s00712-023-00829-8

DOI: 10.1007/s00712-023-00829-8

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