Entry, market structures and welfare

Suryaprakash Mishra ()
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Suryaprakash Mishra: National Law School of India University

Journal of Economics, 2024, vol. 142, issue 3, No 3, 267-276

Abstract: Abstract Conventionally, entry is thought to enhance welfare by enhancing competition and hence lowering prices and increasing the output. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, working with an $$n$$ n -firm Cournot oligopoly set up and using the trigger strategies, we show that entry may or may not impact welfare. However, entry has the potential to alter the market structure from collusion to Cournot competition, and when it does so, there is a discontinuous rise in welfare.

Keywords: Entry; Market structures; Cournot competition; Collusion; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D42 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:142:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s00712-024-00859-w

DOI: 10.1007/s00712-024-00859-w

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