Mixed Oligopoly at Free Entry Markets

Toshihiro Matsumura and Osamu Kanda

Journal of Economics, 2005, vol. 84, issue 1, 27-48

Abstract: We investigate the optimal behavior of a public firm in a mixed market involving private firms and one public firm. Existing works show that welfare-maximizing behavior by the public firm is suboptimal when the number of firms is given exogenously. We allow free entry of private firms and find that, in contrast to the case with the fixed number of firms, welfare-maximizing behavior by the public firm is always optimal in mixed markets. Furthermore, we find that mixed markets are better than pure markets involving no public firm if and only if the public firm earns nonnegative profits. Copyright Springer-Verlag Wien 2005

Keywords: mixed oligopoly; privatization; entry restrictions; H42; L13; C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (197)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00712-004-0098-z (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:84:y:2005:i:1:p:27-48

DOI: 10.1007/s00712-004-0098-z

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economics is currently edited by Giacomo Corneo

More articles in Journal of Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().