How Country and Safety-Net Characteristics Affect Bank Risk-Shifting

Armen Hovakimian, Edward Kane and Luc Laeven

Journal of Financial Services Research, 2003, vol. 23, issue 3, 177-204

Keywords: deposit insurance; regulatory forbearance; moral hazard; financial safety net; risk shifting; regulation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (93)

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Working Paper: How Country and Safety-Net Characteristics Affect Bank Risk-Shifting (2002)
Working Paper: How Country and Safety-Net Characteristics Affect Bank Risk-Shifting (2002)
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1024699811875

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